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 Background & introduction 
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Unique Challenges In Working With JAXA 
• Languages 
– Latin Alphabet 
– Japanese writing system uses 3 main scripts (kanji, hiragana, & 
katakana) 
• Cultural Differences 
– Casualness vs. formality 
– Socially prescribed order in interactions 
• Time Zones (opposite sides of the world) 
• ITAR/EAR Restrictions 
– Extra precautions in handling hardware, design & mission data 
associated with the hardware 
– All written & verbal communications are controlled 
• Communication Formats 
– Paper, cellphones, and requirements interpretation & 
verification 
 
INTERPRETATIONAL DIFFERENCES  
• Project Requirements 
– Requirements & verifications that were not directly tied to the SMA 
Requirements (Safety & Reliability), were secondary & did not have to be 
distributed without a need to know 
– Proprietary, &/or ITAR/EAR 
• Safety and Reliability Requirements 
– JAXA safety requirements were applicable only for the ground processing 
through HTV separation from the launch vehicle 
– Same documents as required by NASA were also mandatory for JAXA (hazard 
reports, safety data packages), and in addition they required unique safety 
compliance matrices 
– JAXA required completion & submittal of a PHA as part of the total safety 
deliverable 
• Methodology and Practices 
– JAXA does not operate via a “close to the safety verification tracking log” and 
tracked to closure. So no Phase III ground /launch safety review until all 
verifications are closed 
– JAXA performs a significant amount of evaluation prior to ground/launch 
safety reviews, such that the reviews themselves are short & concise 
PROBLEM RESOLUTION 
• Cultural Differences addressed via 1 to 2 hour courses based on lessons 
learned from previous visits to Japan, & Kennedy Space Center (KSC) 
experiences during the integration and turnover of payloads on HTV-2 
• An External Interfaces Team worked with the ISS Office and International 
Partners (Russian Space Agency, JAXA, Canadian Space Agency and European 
Space Agency) 
• HTV exposed pallet was in co-development with the SCaN Testbed resulting in 
numerous discoveries in the integration of the payload. This required many 
external interface meetings 
• SCaN Testbed was the first Flight Releasable Adaptor Mechanism (FRAM) 
based payload to be integrated & launched at TNSC resulting in numerous 
discoveries throughout the physical & analytical integration. Required at the 
launch site were all the required FRAM handling & critical lift equipment, 
procedures & training.  As above, many coordination meetings & emails were 
required. 
• 4 weeks of work in testing & preparing the payload for turnover at the TNSC 
site: the Ground Processing Team developed a successful work tempo to each 
work day-1st an early morning coordination meeting was held by the Team at 
the hotel where all the members were collocated; 2nd after arrival at the TNSC 
site, issues & problems were addressed directly between the SCaN Testbed’s 
JAXA Test Manager, & the JAXA’s NASA Interface lead. 
 
SCaN Testbed Ground Processing Teams 
LESSONS LEARNED 
• Project benefitted from the adoption of previous 
Lessons Learned.  Observations of the HTV-2 ground 
processing, led to a method of moving the SCaN 
Testbed & Ground Support Equipment without 
assistance from JAXA  
• It is important to have a clearly understood 
communication channel/process to allow for resolution 
of questions & issues prior to the JAXA safety reviews 
• When working with JAXA, if agreements in work 
responsibilities or understanding of positions on topics 
is not captured in the protocols & action items, there 
can be confusion in what is expected to be completed 
(and when). 
LESSONS LEARNED (concluded) 
• Having a defined verification & validation process 
made completion of processing all the verification 
requirements possible.  But it was important that all 
parties that needed to weigh–in on the verifications 
were part of the process, otherwise the verifications 
had to be revisited & possibly redone 
• Based on lessons learned, the HTV-4 Team will adopt 
the SCaN Testbed’s methodology for the integration & 
ground processing of one payload & two ORUs 
• Having a thorough, well documented, and 
configuration controlled set of reliability analysis is 
invaluable for avoiding “near misses” from a safety, 
reliability, and programmatic viewpoint 
 
Successful launch on H-IIB from TNSC 
 
 Summary & Conclusions 
• Selected important experiences gained & lessons learned from the 
collaboration of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) and the Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) on 
the CoNNeCT Project’s SCaN Testbed were presented. 
• This paper is the final status update of two 2012 RAMS papers about 
the SCaN Testbed that were presented (one on Ground Support 
Equipment Reliability & System Safety, and the other one on 
combined application of System Safety & Reliability for the flight 
system). 
• The SCaN Testbed has been successfully assembled, integrated, 
tested, shipped, launched and installed on the ISS without incident. 
• The steps taken to facilitate international understanding, 
communication, and coordination were successful and hopefully 
these lessons learned can be used by others in the Spaceflight R&M 
community on future missions. 
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 Next steps and future work 
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